Kamuzu Day and Malawi’s Festival of Forgetting

Kamuzu clearly loved Malawi as a country. He took advantage of generous development aid projects of the 1960s to mid 1970s that was aimed at helping develop former European colonies to fulfill his vision for the country. Most of such projects are still visible today. He built the country’s only international airport; hydroelectric power stations that his successors are struggling to upgrade; he built most of the roads that connects the country’s four cities; he oversaw the most competent, organised and disciplined civil service that Malawi has ever had; he built the University of Malawi (the one his successors are failing to run) and he built the two main referral hospitals that the country has.

This is a foundation that sustained his reign of terror. Yet it is the same foundation that his successors could have easily built on when his regime finally fell in 1994.

Like many sub-Saharan Africa countries that were doing away with their dictators in the early to mid 1990s following the end of the Cold War and with the end of Apartheid, Malawians demanded social, economic and political change. External and internal pressure forced Kamuzu to call for a referendum in 1993, giving Malawians a chance to choose whether they wanted to continue with his one party authoritarian rule or to adopt multi-party democracy. 64% of Malawians chose the latter. This led to a 1994 general elections where Kamuzu lost to Bakili Muluzi. Kamuzu was gracious in defeat; he congratulated Muluzi and wished him well before the vote count was over.

Before his death November of 1997, the aged and frail Kamuzu made a public statement asking Malawians who suffered under his autocratic leadership to forgive him. It was an unprecedented and unexpected move. The once mighty “lion” had been humbled, it could no longer roar and it was now owning up to its brutal past. Malawi prides itself as a “God fearing nation”, so probably Kamuzu knew that these “God fearing people” would indeed forgive him, as their Bibles teach. Kamuzu tolerated no dissent or opposing views for the entire 30 years he was in office. If Malawi is indeed a “God fearing” nation then Kamuzu was second inline – he was a demigod to be feared and revered.

Kamuzu created an inward-looking country, where he acquired this divine status that all his people were supposed to look up to. Anyone he felt was a threat to his “life presidency” was jailed, exiled or killed (Elliot reviewed the prison memoirs of the great poet Jack Mapanje a couple of years ago). Legend has it that he would feed some of those jailed to crocodiles. This cannot be verified but the rumour itself speaks volumes of a man Malawians today celebrate as a national hero worth shutting down national business for. On Kamuzu Day there were people sitting and watching in disgust as the nation celebrated as a hero the fallen despot that made their lives hell.

This is understandable and I sympathise with the victims of Kamuzu’s dictatorship. Yet the point of celebrating Kamuzu Day is far more complex than celebrating his life. It is a leadership failure in Malawi that has created this day. It works as a kind of smokescreen, inhibiting critical engagement with our present as much as our past. Malawian politics is not about policies and there are no ideological fault-lines. It is about individuals outdoing each other. When politicians parade their attributes on a political podium, as they do, they are not only talking about themselves, they are contrasting themselves with their rivals. The formula is that of a beauty contest. In this game of personalities none of the Malawi leaders that have come after Kamuzu — Muluzi, Bingu wa Mutharika and Joyce Banda — can outdo him. He built infrastructure and could point to it, and they have not. Simply put: these leaders have failed to build on the foundation Kamuzu built.

Consequently, these leaders have wanted to associate themselves with Kamuzu. If you cannot beat him, join him. Muluzi was slightly different probably because he was a direct successor. Yet he did his best to erase Kamuzu’s name, renaming almost everything that bore Kamuzu’s name. It was Mutharika who built Kamuzu’s lavish mausoleum at taxpayers’ expense. Yet in life Mutharika feared Kamuzu so much that he spent years in self-imposed exile during Kamuzu’s reign. After only one year in office, Joyce Banda has already renamed State House “Kamuzu Palace”. At the time of writing this piece, Banda was in Kasungu, Kamuzu’s home district, attending celebrations – wearing clothes bearing Kamuzu’s face.

It is this kind of nostalgia that has compromised transitional justice in Malawi. Malawi could well be the only country that celebrates the life of its autocratic dictator. No wonder that the Machiavellian figure of John Tembo, Kamuzu’s long time right-hand man and overseer of many of Kamuzu’s policies, remains prominent in mainstream politics today as the leader of Kamuzu’s party, the Malawi Congress Party. He is the leader of opposition in parliament and though he turns 81 years old this September, he will still contest the presidency once again in 2014. Tembo’s political durability is in part down to the fact that the succession of failed leaders that have come after 1994 means his MCP is, not unreasonably, regarded as Malawi’s most successful ruling party ever. Yet the history of that party tells its own story about Kamuzu. The MCP was the party of liberation formed by a generation of freedom fighters, who were later to suffer under Kamuzu’s presidency. The founder of the MCP was the late Orton Chirwa, who together with his wife, Vera, was arrested by Kamuzu 1981. Orton died in jail in 1992; Vera was released at the turn of multiparty democracy in 1993. Until today the couple remain Africa’s longest serving prisoners of conscience.

There have been some younger Malawians aspiring for leadership positions, including presidency. Unfortunately, some of them have already joined the hero worship bandwagon. As a way of justifying that the youth can also hold leadership positions, some of these younger aspirants are arguing that Kamuzu had the youngest-ever cabinet in the history of Malawi. Referring to his first cabinet, of 1964. Yet most of these yet aspirants forget to mention what happened next.

Kamuzu got rid of all these young intellectuals and leaders, one by one, following the Cabinet Crisis of 1964. Notably Henry Masauko Chipembere and Kanyama Chiume were exiled, and Yatuta Chisiza, like his brother Dunduzu before him, was gunned down by security forces. This epitomised Kamuzu’s 30 years rule. In 1983 there was the well documented case of Mwanza murders where four MPs were killed for simply suggesting that Kamuzu was ageing therefore there was a need to start succession plans. Of course the courts acquitted Kamuzu and Tembo in the trial that followed multiparty democracy simply because the government was too inept. For the record, Malawi government has never won any high profile case since 1994 – and there have been quite a few.

Tossing around Kamuzu’s name and image as a political tool is making Kamuzu into a heroic saint that bears little resemblance to the historical record. He was a ruthless authoritarian that caused a lot of pain to many people whose relatives and parents languished in jails, exile and some were killed without committing any crime at all. He ran a state without a justice system. He was the sole arbiter of truth. This is the side of Kamuzu that is slowly being erased from nation history, deliberately or not, and as we blur the lines of our past, it becomes more and more difficult to understand our present. Airbrushing Kamuzu’s legacy and creating false nostalgia that is only aimed at diverting the national psyche from current leadership failures is not only injustice for those that suffered during his reign, it also stifles national progress and development.

Malawi will not develop if nostalgia and hero-worshiping are drivers of its leadership. The country needs visionary leaders ready for public service. Leaders with policies that can drive the nation forward; this has nothing to do with anybody’s age, gender or tribe. Here the electorate have a role to pay: look beyond personalities and focus on their policies instead.

Joyce Banda: Between Saving the Economy and Winning Elections

Last October the president of Malawi, Joyce Banda, told European Union delegates in Brussels that she was ready to sacrifice her political career for economic reforms in the country. Banda was mainly referring to a 40 percent currency devaluation that her administration implemented a few weeks after its ascendency to power on 7th April last year. This followed the sudden death of her predecessor, Bingu wa Mutharika, who succumbed to a heart attack two days earlier.

Banda’s Brussels statement sounded very patriotic, statesman-like and reminiscent of a great leader – she may yet be any of these. But in this context, the statement underlined a conundrum that has, thus far, been the defining feature of President Banda’s leadership.

The Malawian economy is almost entirely dependent on grants and donations. Banda has admitted that without outside help the country is in dire straights. Having inherited an economy on the verge of collapse, after being deserted by donors due to Mutharika’s poor diplomatic relations, perceived arrogance and deteriorated human rights record, Banda is only too aware of the importance of continuing to keep them sweet. The situation has given donors bargaining power, which has forced Banda to accept their advice, including IMF austerity measures willy-nilly. Banda recently told a Guardian documentary that “if our friends and international partners do not come, if they packed they packed up today and left, we are dead.”

The donor prescribed economic measures have not always been popular locally; this is a problem for Banda because she cannot afford to alienate the donors or the people that give her a mandate to govern. She has already witnessed Mutharika’s fall from grace after failing to negotiate such a conundrum. Mutharika saw donors walking out on him and died a hated figure at home, to the extent that a section of Malawians celebrated his death – something unheard of in the country’s traditions.

The problem of having to please two parties whose demands are not always mutual is that eventually something will have to give – hence her “I am ready to sacrifice my political career” assertion. Yet Banda is not sacrificing herself just yet and is fighting hard for her political career. In doing so, she has had to master the art of political doublespeak and would never make a statement like the above whilst in Malawi – where all her speeches are crafted to fit in with her ambition of winning 2014 elections. I previously made a case that the Joyce Banda the world sees may not be the one Malawians know.

Upon her ascendancy to power she made sure she reversed all the Mutharika era policies that were frown upon by donors – something Malawians were generally happy to accept. She has done it with some considerable success and is enjoying a lot of good will from the international community. The currency devaluation that her predecessor staunchly refused to do has been her most visible concession to the donors, especially the IMF. This is also crucial insofar as her ambition to attract badly needed investors in Malawi is concerned.

Some economic challenges have somewhat eased, especially fuel and foreign currency shortages – though increasingly expensive and unaffordable for many people due to high inflation rates. But a big majority of Malawians agreed on the necessity of the currency devaluation; it was well overdue and it was inevitable if the economy was to get back on track.

The contentious issue, however, has been its implementation – particularly the lack of proper measures to cushion poor and vulnerable people from its effects. Another related issue is the pegging of the Kwacha to the US Dollar, which in the last seven months has seen inflation rising from 20.1 per cent to 21.7. This makes it the highest inflation rate in SADC (Southern Africa Development of Community). This is also the lowest the Kwacha has been since 1993, when the country was undergoing transition from one party state to multiparty democracy.

Last month, the consumer rights group (Cama) organised a national protest against the rising cost of living. They delivered a petition giving the government an ultimatum of 21 days to address the issues raised or face more protests. The Civil service trade union has also warned that its members will stage a sit in protest on 11th and 12th February. They are unhappy about the working conditions of civil servants, poor salaries and the government’s apparent lack of interest in addressing these problems.

Currently there is also worrying drug shortage in hospitals which, according to the ministry responsible, means hospitals are lacking 95 percent of the supplies they need. A few weeks ago 15 concerned doctors from Kamuzu Central Hospital, a referral hospital in the capital Lilongwe, signed an open letter to president Banda asking for her intervention. The doctors said that the situation had forced them use their personal money to buy basic medical necessities for patients.

Some civil society groups have questioned why the government intervened swiftly to supplement the farm input subsidy programme (fisp) when it fell short earlier this year but is yet to stage a similar intervention in the health service. The government has since promised a procurement of drugs – the first since 2009.

The answer may be that politically Fisp is a crucial programme. The Majority of beneficiaries are from the rural population who form the majority of the voting block. Approximately 86 percent of Malawians live in rural areas. Mutharika’s landslide in 2009 elections is largely attributed to the subsidies programme. Joyce Banda’s decisiveness on fisp and demonstrably lax approach in other areas of the economy is an indication of her seriousness about the 2014 elections. She is uncertain about her chances, because of the struggling economy, but also because she has never before contested an election as President and the political party she formed two years ago, after she was expelled from Mutharika’s then party, will be facing its first elections.

Balancing working with the donors – whose economic recovery policies are clearly hurting Malawians (whose votes Joyce Banda want in 2014) – is the President’s main priority. It has been a defining feature of her first 10 months in power and will remain the case, especially as the country draws closer to elections day.

Why do African countries hire non-African football coaches so much?

It seemed strange when in the run-up to Afcon 2013, Nigeria’s coach Stephen Keshi forcefully criticised African football associations for their preference for white coaches. That when Zambia, until this week the great success story of African football, had Hervé Renard to thank for masterminding their unlikely triumph last year in Libreville. Yet Keshi has a point.

The success of Zambia under Renard should not obscure the fact that African football administrators have always failed to appreciate and make use of its own resources and talent. This is true of football as it is of Africa’s national economies. (As it’s turned out, the split between local- and European-coached teams in the quarter finals is even, four of each, but the stand-out coach, Cape Verde’s press-conference-crooner Lucio Antunes, is decidedly homegrown).

Keshi told BBC Sport that white coaches are not doing anything that African coaches cannot do. “I am not a racist but that’s just the way it is.” Keshi added that African FAs favour European coaches over African: “You tell a white person they need a year to adapt, to know the country and the players–they are told ‘don’t worry, take your time.’ That is unprofessional and is one thing that is killing African football,” Keshi argued.

This is a perennial debate in Africa; it is always there when a football tournament is on in Africa. Prior to 2010 Fifa World Cup, former Malawi national football team coach Kinnah Phiri also told BBC World Service that “it’s not fair for us African coaches not to be given a chance to run our own national teams because in the first place most of us are well trained, I trained in Britain; so to me, I think it’s just because of our own mentality as Africans that we do not believe in our people.”

As it happens, Keshi is currently in-charge of Nigeria and Phiri has just lost his job, after a string of bad results at the end of a lengthy tenure, suggesting that these two have been given a fair chance by their respective countries. Yet they paint a bigger picture than this.

For instance, Malawi has had a fair share of expatriate coaches that have not brought any success (take your pick from the itinerant German Burkhard Ziese, the Dane Kim Splidsboel and Englishmen Alan Gillett, Michael Hennigan and Stephen Constantine) . Malawi has never qualified for the World Cup. It has twice qualified for Afcon, in 1984 and 2010. Local coaches had been in charge on both occasions: the late Henry Moyo in 1984 and Phiri in 2010.

Egypt is the most successful football team in the Afcon history; it has won the trophy seven times, mainly with local coaches–take the recent three successive victories (2006, 2008 and 2010) when Hassan Shehata was in charge. These days they’re coached by an American, Bob Bradley, and they no longer qualify for international tournaments, most recently beaten by the mighty Central African Republic. Ghana has won the tournament four times, with a local coach guiding the team on all the four occasions. (Recently, in a brilliant BBC interview, Black Stars legend Osei Kofi, lamented the “mismanagement” that had seen so many Black Stars sides coached by Europeans.) A foreign coach has never won the World Cup on any of the 18 occasions it has been held.

The pandemonium that gripped African football prior to the 2010 World Cup is very telling. Of the six African countries present at that tournament, only Algeria had a local coach, Rabah Saadane, Ivory Coast had the Swede Sven-Goran “not-here-for-the-money” Eriksson. Another Swede, Lars Lagerback was in charge of Nigeria. Cameroon had a Frenchman, Paul Le Guen, while South Africa had a former World Cup wining coach, Carlos Alberto Perreira from Brazil. Ghana had a Serb, Milovan Rajevac.

All these were experienced coaches, in various degrees. Yet their appointments (not so much for Ghana and South Africa) vindicate Keshi and Phiri. Eriksson was hired less than four months before the tournament. In fact, Eriksson after he had just been sacked by Mexico, as the Mexicans were in danger of failing to qualify for the same tournament.

Nigeria sacked a local coach, Shaibu Amodu, who qualified the team to the tournament, in favour of Lagerback. Lagerback had just failed to qualify his own country, Sweden to the same tournament. Cameroon went for Le Guen who had no experience of coaching in Africa (he’d just been hounded out of Scotland’s Glasgow Rangers) and he had an unrealistically short time to organise the team, which had also achieved qualification under a different coach. South Africa’s appointment had some logic, as Perreira is a World Cup winning coach (1994) and had the luck of not having to qualify the team, as South Africa were hosts. Ghana was the only team that maintained a coach from the qualifying rounds. Ghana was the only African team that made it past the group stages and it was by far the most convincing of the African teams at the tournament, only knocked out by the dastardly Luis Suarez on that unforgettable night at Soccer City.

African football seems to be following the path of its national economies: so much resources and human talent but always looking to the West for help. Yet Africa has a massive pool of footballers playing in the top leagues in Europe and elsewhere. (The Economist suggested that in Ivory Coast footballers may yet overtake cocoa as the country’s main export product.) This speaks volumes of the available talent, and Ivory Coast is just one of many similar examples. (The Ivorians made the extraordinary decision of firing the popular François Zahoui, and choosing former Parma midfielder Sabri Lamouchi, a man with no managerial experience whatsoever, to lead the team at this Afcon. Les Elephants are looking good, but then don’t forget they didn’t concede a single goal at the last tournament under Zahoui.)

European coaches are products of the same leagues that most Africans play for. As Phiri pointed out, Africans and Europeans attend the same coaching courses yet African FAs still see expatriate coaches above African coaches, and are happy to pay them a far higher salary. Familiarity breeds contempt; this is particularly true of Africa. It is the only continent that fails to recognise and exploit its vast footballing expertise for its own benefit.

Africa’s national football teams have failed to improve under foreign coaches and there is nothing to suggest that it will ever improve. Let’s face it, a coach that is useful in Europe would never leave for Africa (where is Sven now?). Why would they? It is the same way that aid dependency continues to fail Africa, only its own resources and talent can bring its national teams success on the biggest stages.

When Wikipedia gets to write Malawi’s national history

Malawians yesterday staged popular demonstrations against egregious rises in the cost of living brought about by the economic reforms made by President Joyce Banda, under orders from the International Monetary Fund. If the spirit of popular protest is alive and well today, it’s no thanks to The Daily Times newspaper, who earlier this week ran an “article” purporting to commemorate Malawi’s first great anti-colonial hero that they’d lifted word for word from Wikipedia.

Every January 15, Malawi celebrates John Chilembwe Day and remembers the life of Reverend Chilembwe, the first and perhaps the most revered of all the Malawian freedom fighters. Western-educated, Chilembwe returned to Nyasaland (now Malawi) around 1900, after 7 years studying theology in the United States, where he is believed to have encountered the works of black thinkers such as Booker T Washington, advocating black empowerment and pan-Africanism.

On his return, Chilembwe was frustrated by colonial racism and he objected to the British government’s order that the Nyasas should go to Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and fight in the First World War against the Germans. His frustrations forced him into an unsuccessful rebellion that came to be known as the Chilembwe Uprising, soon after which he is thought to have died on February 3 1915, as he fled into Mozambique. His burial site is unknown and there is no consensus among historians whether he was indeed killed or simply disappeared.

However, it is his bravery and love for his people that has made him a martyr and a national hero. Everyone learns about him at school and until last year his face was on all Malawian banknotes. Only the 500 Kwacha note (pictured above) now bears his face; other historical figures have been added on the rest of the banknotes, such as Rose Chibambo, a hero of the independence struggle and Malawi’s first cabinet minister.

Newspapers have always carried supplements about Chilembwe’s life for Chilembwe Day — his achievements, vision and whatever lessons media organisations think Malawians can learn from his life. This year was no exception, but it was the first time in nearly ten years that I have read the supplements, as I had always been out of the country during this period.

Malawi has only two daily newspapers: The Nation and The Daily Times. I only bought the latter. It had 24 supplementary pages on the subject — an impressive amount of space that was not matched by the breadth of the articles. The content could have been much better.

What caught my eye, however, was an article solemnly entitled: “Important facts about John Chilembwe”. I noticed that this article had no by-line, so I checked at the bottom, where it was indicated that the entire article had been copy-pasted from John Chilembwe’s Wikipedia entry.

The Daily Times has just published a Wikipedia entry? I felt something was wrong, not only because I found it irresponsible to relegate a national history, the story of a national hero, to Wikipedia, but also because I know The Daily Times has a lot of capable journalists who could have done a better job. If not, could the newspaper not ask one of the many distinguished Malawian historians to write on Chilembwe?

This had lack of seriousness painted all over it. Why did The Daily Times not prepare properly for Chilembwe Day? I am aware that Wikipedia is free and that a lack of editorial resources could have forced the decision. Yet I still find it insulting to the national intelligence. Have we stooped so low that we are relying on Wikipedia to give us “facts” about our national heroes? I thought “facts” ought to be verifiable? How do you verify Wikipedia entries that have faceless authors and editors whose expertise is unknown? Shouldn’t we expect more from a national newspaper?

Is the Joyce Banda the world sees the Joyce Banda Malawians know?

Joyce Banda, the fourth President of Malawi, is among this year’s Foreign Policy list of 100 Global Thinkers for “stepping in – and up – to fix a broken country” after her predecessor Bingu wa Mutharika died suddenly of a heart attack in April this year. She’s in there at Number 22, well behind Paul Ryan, just behind George Soros and miles ahead of the other Africans on the list, Chinua Achebe and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.

FP rightly points out that President Banda faces a mammoth task in trying to stabilise the faltering economy inherited from Mutharika:

Her work is cut out for her. So far, however, all signs suggest Banda could become a new model for African leadership – shedding the strongman syndrome and getting down to business to help the poor. To prove it she has cut her own salary by 30 per cent and put her predecessor’s $12 million presidential jet and most of his fleet of 60 luxury cars up for sale.

As I have argued before, President Banda needed to do this, she had no option. These were necessary measures if the country was to regain the confidence of the donor community that deserted the country en masse due to her predecessor’s poor human rights record, bad governance and poor diplomatic relations (swapping diplomatic expulsions with the UK, but establishing new ties with countries like Armenia and Mongolia).

Reversing Mutharika’s policies was the most straightforward and predictable task before her. Anyone coming into her position would have needed to do it; the main challenge for President Banda was to come up with her own policies, and this remains a challenge. Apart from the 30 per cent pay cut she and her deputy have taken, lavish government spending and misplaced priorities are still endemic in Malawi.

Local media are packed with headlines about various civil society groups, faith organisations and NGOs asking Banda and her administration to reduce unnecessary spending and to get their priorities right. Most of these pleas have been welcomed with rebuttals and excuses from the government. Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), a local coalition of over 100 civil society organisations recently observed that the President’s endless travel “mocks” the pay cut.

The organisation’s director, Dalitso Kubalasa told a local daily newspaper, The Daily Times that the pay cut was “not good enough,” adding:

We at MEJN advocated for an immediate reciprocal cut on their subsistence allowances especially for cabinet ministers, for the austerity measures’ symbolism be complete and truly make a difference.

Most local analysts initially saw the pay cut as a political gesture and not a fiscal measure, aimed at reflecting the country’s hard economic times. It is crucial to have in mind that while steadying the staggering economy may be President Banda’s priority, she also has her sights on 2014 elections. Therefore, the 30 per cent pay cut is also aimed at the electorate, the majority of whom would happily accept the symbolic gesture without questioning what it actually means.

The news of the pay cut also got international media excited. Unsurprisingly, almost all of these news organisations saw the pay cut as a refreshing story given that the majority of news about African presidents is about greed and corruption. This meant that there was a lack of proper analysis from the international media. A Google search on the subject indicates that 17 of the first 20 results are from international media organisations.

It’s thus surprising that Banda made it onto FP’s list based on the reasons they provided. FP’s point that President Banda could shed the continent’s “strongman syndrome” and get “down to business to help the poor,” clearly shows that FP have arrived at their conclusions largely based on international media reports, that do not use local reporters.

It is becoming apparent that dual personality is an emerging trend among Malawi presidents. Mutharika is arguably much more revered elsewhere than he ever was in Malawi. Steven Sharra, a Malawian blogger, set out this argument in the aftermath of Mutharika’s death, asking: “Was the Bingu Africa saw the Bingu Malawians Knew?” The British government seems to have sensed the dual personality pattern. They recently acknowledged many areas in which Banda has had notable achievements thus far. Yet they also pointed out that there are still many issues that need sorting out, including “domestic accountability”.

Banda has certainly got the knack of playing it to the donors, as she has on the issue of homosexuality. She got the international community excited that she was repealing the laws while at home she’s stayed mum. Amnesty International got excited about it while Banda’s justice minister denied it at home.

This is something FP has clearly missed or chosen to ignore. Had FP had a researcher in Malawi for this piece, which I doubt they did, they could have come up with a more accurate conclusion that reflects the actual reality in Malawi.

I am happy that President Banda is on the list and I believe she deserves it, more so than many others listed. Mutharika left the country’s economy in tatters and it was a nation of people without hope. Joyce Banda’s elevation gave people hope, both Malawians and those in the international community. But I disagree with the grounds of her inclusion – it’s flawed. Perhaps it would have been better to concentrate of global achievements, it is a list of global thinkers after all.

No, Mr President, You Don’t Need 26 Years in Power to Become ‘an Expert in Governance’

After over two and half decades in power, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda recently boasted of expertise in governance – brought by his 26 years of presidency. 26 years in power is a very long time, by any measure. There is a whole generation of Ugandans that have not known any other leader but Museveni.

Yet history recalls that President Museveni’s remarks contracts what he said when he initially came to power in 1986:

“The problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power.”

And here is President Museveni 26 years later (2012):

“Some people think that being in the government for a long time is a bad thing. But the more you stay, the more you learn. I am now an expert in governance.”

That is the difference presidency make. Yet Museveni is not a lone in this, it is a continental problem. Malawi’s former president, Bakili Muluzi once believed that African presidents, Malawi in particular, should not be in power for more than a decade. This was in the aftermath of the fall of Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s 31 years of dictatorship.

After winning a re-election for a second and last term in office, Muluzi saw things differently. Now he need more than two terms in office “to finish his development projects.” Muluzi launched a ferocious campaign for a constitutional change to allow himself more time in power. Fortunately, parliamentarians vetoed the motion and democracy carried the day – credit to Muluzi for accepting the defeating though.

President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal must have learned from Muluzi’s failed attempt. Wade came into power in 2000 for a 7-year term and got re-elected in 2007 under a new constitution, which reduced the term limits to five years. In 2008 the constitution was changed again to allow for two 7-year terms. This would be from 2012. It is important here to notice that these constitutional changes happened on Wade’s watch. Now Wade has refused to step down after two consecutive terms in office. He has argued that the constitutional changes allow him to run again. The Senegalese courts have backed him, and bar Wade’s most formidable opponent, musician Youssou N’Dour.

After fracas and political unrest that has followed these events, Nigerian former president, Olusegun Obasanjo tried in vain to talk Wade into stepping down. Ironically, Obasanjo himself tried in vain to extend his term limits in 2007.

Surely there is something about African presidential seat that only people like Museveni, Muluzi, Wade and Obasanjo can explain. However, it has nothing to do with experience or development, as Museveni and Muluzi, respectively, want the world to believe. It has everything to do with self-serving politics of the continent.

While in the West politicians are not corrupt-free, UK’s MPs expenses scandal is the best example. Yet if people in the West want to get filthy rich they get into banking, stock trading, hedge funds etc., in Africa you join politics. This is what incentivise African politicians, particularly presidents to cling on to power.

Yes, experience is desirable in many aspects of our lives and activities but not with governance. Unless if we decide to ignore traditional forms of democratic governance, and adopt chief executive style of leadership – with one man calling the shots. Presidents come to power without experience of that position anyway, unless it is a comeback, which is unlikely in places where term limits apply.

To have good governance and functioning governments you need a vibrant and independent civil service and civil society, independent police, in the service of the people not the state, separation of powers between the arms of government and respect for the rule of law. It’s presidents like Museveni who have convinced themselves of their expertise that compromise good governance because they do not listen to anyone and this underestimate the rule of law.

What the Arab Spring can learn from sub-Saharan Africa

The Arab Spring has been inspirational in sub-Saharan Africa, home to some of the world’s longest serving leaders. Yet the protagonists of the Arab Spring have more to learn from their sub-Saharan Africa counterparts than the other way round.

There were high hopes amongst commentators and observers that the ‘Arab Spring’ would extend its reach to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This has yet to happen; at least in the way it was envisaged. There have been pockets of revolt and demonstrations against incumbent administrations most notably in Malawi, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda. The political atmosphere in these countries remains tense, as the demands of the many citizens of these respective countries have not been met. However we may yet see a revolution of some sort somewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.

Talk to activists in these countries and you will hear that the majority of them agree that the Arab Spring has been inspirational. This is understandable – sub-Saharan Africa is a home to some of the longest serving and oldest leaders in the world. Yet the protagonists of the Arab Spring have more to learn from their sub-Saharan Africa counterparts than the other way round. The majority of sub-Sahara African countries peacefully did away with one party rule in the 1990s. These countries continue to struggle to solidify their democracies due to the enduring lack of necessary democratic institutions and the prevalence of selfish, greedy and opportunistic leaders.

The failure to acknowledge the difference between struggles in sub-Saharan Africa and those in the north of the continent may well be an issue of prejudice and contempt for the people of sub-Saharan Africa. There is an unfortunate feeling amongst commentators from the majority of the world that people from this region cannot stage any revolt of their own. They have to copy it from elsewhere – the newly liberated Arab states in this case. This suggestion at least has the merit of pointing to the struggle for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, which certainly isn’t lacking in this regard. There is no region in the world that holds more elections than sub-Saharan Africa.

But democracy is more than the right to vote. Demonstrations in Malawi this summer were mistakenly labelled an “Arab Spring in the south of the Sahara”, Malawian civil society organisations and activists may have drawn some inspiration from here, but in fact Malawi offers a perfect lesson for the future to the ‘Arab Spring’ – how to avoid sliding back into dictatorship once the struggle for democracy is won.

Images of happy Tunisian men and women raising ink-painted fingers indicating that they have voted were a great sight. Yet this is not a big issue in countries like Malawi – Malawians have voted since 1994 in what have largely been considered free and fair elections. The country has held four successful presidential and parliamentary elections since its return to multiparty democracy in 1993. The last elections were in 2009 where the incumbent President, Bingu wa Mutharika was re-elected with 66.17% of the national vote – thanks to the success of his agricultural subsidies that tripled maize harvest in fours years. Yet a 2009 Wikileaks classified cable shows that the then USA ambassador to Malawi, Peter W. Bodde acknowledged his fear about Malawi’s democratic future. Bode noted:

“Six months into President Bingu wa Mutharika’s second term, MALAWI’s continued development as a multiparty democracy is slowing. Once lauded as a leader dedicated to development of MALAWI’s democracy, Mutharika’s commitment to democratic norms in now coming into question… The recent legalisation of warrantless searches has raised concerns about civil liberties. Wirth the backing of compliant parliament, President Mutharika’s moves show a disturbing trend line.”

I wrote of my worry about the warrantless searches at the time but it was perhaps too close to President Mutharika’s re-election for a lot of people to pay attention. Also, President Mutharika was overseeing impressive economic growth. This was a perfect moment for the Malawi government to pass legislation that threatens prevailing civil liberties. It was not necessarily the repressive laws that eventually angered Malawians. The July 20th demonstrations that left 20 people dead – killed by national security service – were ignited by a persistent lack of fuel, lack of foreign currency, perennial electricity cuts and of course declining democratic freedoms in the country.

Unlike the Arab Spring however, the driving force behind the July 20 demonstrations in Malawi was not necessarily regime change. People were simply making modest and reasonable demands that every government, not least a democratic one, should meet. The protests exposed the lack of democratic institutions that have allowed Mutharika’s administration to rule with total impunity. Owing, in part, to what the ambassador Bodde’s cable described as “a compliant parliament”.

This shows that democracy is not a one-way street. Once attained, citizens must be on their toes and defend it ferociously. A free vote is most valued by those that have been deprived of it for a long time. This carries with it a danger that people’s excitement makes them blind to the fact that democracy does not begin and end at the ballot box. There are some significant differences between the Arab region and sub-Saharan Africa, cultural and geo-political, but the Arab countries must pay attention and draw some valuable lessons on how hard-earned democracy is unraveling in the region despite its record number of votes.

Has President Bingu wa Mutharika got the word ‘sorry’ in his vocabulary?

Malawi government is finally coming to grips with the fact that it cannot do without Western help, especially the frozen British aid – at least not in the manner that it decided to let Britain’s £19 million annual budgetary support slip when there was still a chance to rescue it.

Yet President Bingu wa Mutharika remains a proud man, he will not accept that he erred by deporting the British High Commissioner, Fergus Cochrane-Dyet in April this year as a result of a leaked cable that accused the president of being “increasingly autocratic and intolerance of criticism”.

If Britain ever doubted the accuracy of the Cochrane-Dyet’s cable, then President Mutharika’s decision to declare the Commissioner a persona non grataput all the doubts to rest. But the fact is that there were no doubts about the contents of the cable in the first place, the British and indeed the donor community were already aware that democratic, civil and human rights in Malawi were in gradual decline.

One of the leaked cables from whistle blowing website, Wikileaks, entitled “Democratic Norms Under Pressure” shows that declining democratic standards in Malawi was a common knowledge with diplomatic circles. The cable, categorised as confidential, from American Embassy in Lilongwe dated 22/12/2009 shows that donors were already worried about Malawi’s democratic prospects under President Mutharika, barely six months after his landslide re-election victory in 2009.

The cable summary reads: “Six months into President Bingu wa Mutharika’s second term, MALAWI’s continued development as a multiparty democracy is slowing. Once lauded as a leader dedicated to development of MALAWI’s democracy, Mutharika’s commitment to democratic norms is now coming into question. MALAWI’s parliament dominated by the president’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), offers no meaningful check on his legislative agenda. Constitutional amendments and changes to standing orders in the legislative body have passed with minimal debate. Criticism of the judiciary, as well as disregard for court decisions, is becoming more frequent. The recent legislation of warrantless searches has raised concern about civil liberties. With the backing of compliant parliament, President Mutharika’s moves show a disturbing trend line. End summary.”

Even though it is a plausible move, the way the current government efforts to regain trust from Britain have been devised shows that President Mutharika and his government are very short on details and they have greatly underestimated the extent of knowledge and amount information that the donors have on Malawi. If the Malawi government had better insight, the PR exercise by President Mutharika on BBC Africa Have Your Say (BBC AHYS) programme last week, which aimed at presenting himself as open and tolerant by taking questions from Malawians would have been moulded differently.

President Mutharika does not directly speak to Malawians in Malawi (if anything he addresses Malawians). He has never conducted a BBC-style phone-in programme on any of Malawi radio stations; seven years into his presidency, he has not attended any parliamentary session to listen to what MPs have from their people. Instead he has un-elected spokesman, Heatherwick Ntaba who speaks for him. Why did he found it appropriate to speak to Malawians via the BBC then and why now?

We can now tell that he thought this would make things easier for a delegation he had dispatched to London for talks aimed at improving the tattered relations between Malawi and Britain. The BBC interview turns out to be a disaster, in so far as its intended purpose is concerned.

First, clearly showed that Malawi was now desperate for cash. This will put Britain, which has nothing to lose anyway, in a better bargaining position. Second, President Mutharika’s admission that things went wrong but reluctant to take any responsibility is indicative of a man who has not repented. The former colonial masters have clearly played on this weakness by demanding that President Mutharika takes responsibility for expelling Fergus Cochrane-Dye if any talks with Britain are to proceed.

It is a tall order for a President who appears not to have the word “sorry” in his vocabulary. He is facing the same demands from Zambia’s new President, Michael Sata for his “embarrassing treatment” when as Zambia’s leader of opposition was deported by President Mutharika while visiting Malawi’s former President, Bakili Muluzi four years ago. Is it that time to eat the humble pie? It takes a man to say sorry after all.

UK’s cosy relationship with Rwanda: rose-tinted glasses?

Rwandan and Zimbabwean refugee communities in Britain are allegedly living in fear and have become suspicious of each other after an alert that they have been infiltrated by spies sent by their respective governments to “stifle, sometimes to kill” political exiles, according to a recent BBC Radio 4’s File on 4 programme.

Jonathan Musonera, a Rwandan exile said on the programme that he has been approached and warned by the British police that he was in danger, as he is wanted by the Rwandan government. It is alleged: “conventional and unconventional means have been used [in the past]” to deal with critics of the government.

Musonera told the programme that he has “moved houses more than seven times and I cook by myself…because I cant trust anybody… many people have been poisoned.” Musonera believes he is in danger because he is a member of Rwandan National Congress, an opposition party to President Paul Kagame’s ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front.

Kagame is widely credited for the crucial role he played in uniting warring Rwandan ethnic groups and bringing stability to a country that suffered large-scale genocide 17 years ago where an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the space of 100 days. Eight years into his presidency, Mr Kagame has been facing growing criticism for his intolerance of criticism, stifling opposing views and not allowing real opposition parties and groups to emerge in the country.

Questions have been raised about Britain’s continued bilateral aid to the Rwandan government. At £80 million annually, Britain remains its largest donor. Paul Rusesabagina, who is credited for saving an estimated, 200 people during the genocide and is now an exiled fierce critic of Kagame, has called on Western donors, Britain in particular, to stop bilateral aid to Rwanda. His advice is to channel aid through humanitarian organisations and NGOs. DfID, Britain’s international development agency appeared to agree with Mr Rusesabagina, despite its growing funding contribution to Rwanda. DfID’s statement said:

“Where a government fails to live up to the standards we expect, we do not believe that it would be right or fair to penalise the poor and vulnerable. So we find other ways to provide support through NGOs and charities, or diplomatic and aid relationships that allow Britain to address such issues as respect for human rights, rule of law and corruption.”

Predictably perhaps, Rwandan representatives in the UK have denied all such accusations, citing Rwanda’s strong links with the UK and lack of clear evidence for the allegations. In May this year, the Rwandan High commissioner, Ernest Rwamucyo told the BBC: “the government of Rwanda does not threaten the lives of its citizens wherever they live.” Yet six men, believed to be working for the Rwandan government are on trial in South Africa for the attempted assassination of an exiled former Rwandan military general, Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa.

Amid these allegations, DFID has maintained that it has a “candid” relationship with the Rwandan government:

“The UK / Rwandan relationship is a candid one, and we raise these issues where we have concerns on a regular basis at senior level, including concerns over political space, media freedom and extrajudicial killings. We continue to urge the government of Rwanda to address these issues and bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice.”

This statement is almost an admission by the British that Kagame, the saviour of Rwanda, does not deserve to be punished in any way. If things go wrong Britain and Rwanda governments talk “at senior level” and we “urge” him to change. On his recent visit to Rwanda, UK Secretary of State for Overseas Development Andrew Mitchell told local media that “aid to Rwanda will increase by 50 percent over the next four years”. Barring the technical and somewhat controversial issue of Rwandan spies, which came from Britain’s own security forces, the number of exiled Rwandans alone is enough to alert the British government that something is wrong with Kagame’s administration.

Human Rights Watch have raised similar concerns over Kagame’s increasing rejection of criticism and stifling of opposition parties. In its 2010 report, World Report 2011: Rwanda, the organisation noticed that “none of the three new opposition parties were able to nominate candidates” in the country’s last presidential election that re-elected Kagame with an unprecedented 98.3 percent of the vote.

Britain must see the writing on the wall and realise that if it does not take decisive action now it could be nurturing yet another African dictator. Kagame has done excellent work in overseeing a peaceful and difficult transition. And Rwanda is currently enjoying good economic growth. Yet all dictators were once good guys. The British government must review its “candid relationship” with Mr Kagame, or accept that it is complicit with his intolerance and brutality.

The Human Cost of “War on Drugs”

The recent Global Commission on Drug Polity report has made it clear that “the war on drugs has failed”. The 19-member commission comprised a former United Nations Secretary general, former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and a host of other influential people, including a host of intellectuals.

In Britain, celebrities and influential people, including Sir Richard Branson, are calling for the British government to decriminalise drugs. It is not a new debate. In fact, the study has only confirmed a view that many people, among them top politicians such as Prime Minister David Cameron, already knew. Yet history suggests that Cameron will not even consider a policy review on drugs. In the USA, Barack Obama has pledged its continued help for Mexico’s “war on drugs”.

This has been and continues to be a predominantly middle class and technocrats led debate between pro and anti drug decriminalisation camps. The real victims on the frontlines of this “war” are never heard. That is what the drugs debate hardly considers: the human cost of the drugs trade. Director Rachel Seifert’s Cocaine Unwrapped (2011), a film shot in the frontlines of the drugs industry, from coca farmers in the Americas to the streets of Baltimore, tells this ignored story of how this illegal, brutal and unregulated trade is destroying lives of poor farmers and predominantly disfranchised black youth in the USA.

Contrary to the mainstream media facilitated debate, it is not the drugs that are destroying people’s livelihoods but policies guiding the unregulated trade. It is now 40 years since President Richard Nixon launched a “war on drugs”, and 50 years since the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotics criminalised drugs. These measures have only escalated violence and deaths are still mounting. It is estimated that over $6 billion has been spent fighting production in Colombia alone. Yet the country remains the principal global supplier of cocaine. 37,000 people are estimated dead in Mexico alone, on average 12 are being killed everyday. The violence has worsened since 2006 when Mexican President Felipe Calderon decided, with the help of the USA, to use military force to fight drug cartels. An estimated 500,000 people are in prison in the USA on drugs charges. These staggering figures have not stopped, and there is no evidence that it will stop, the demand for drugs.

Bolivian president Evo Morales, a former coca farmer himself, has pointed out that farmers in the Americas will always produce and supply coca, so long as there is demand for it. Morales has repeatedly argued that coca is not cocaine; it is tribal plant that Bolivians have used for at least the last 500 years. A Bolivian government official argues that blaming coca alone for drugs problem in the West is the same as blaming a sugar cane for alcohol abuse.

Many peasants do not plant coca for criminal reasons, it is a source of income and many farmers would be happy to stop the supply if there was alternative and viable way of earning a living. A passing of law in Bolivia that allows farmers to plant a smaller amount of coca, mostly for traditional use and production of other useful products, has tremendously reduced the problem in Bolivia. It is the criminalisation and efforts to get rid of coca without giving the farmers alternative ways of survival that is fuelling the coca production. It is the indiscriminate fumigation of plantation with the aim of killing coca that is forcing peasants to plant the crop. A farmer observed that there was no point in planting other crops because it will be fumigated anyway. It felt better to lose coca to these chemicals than a legal crop, he argued.

50 years of criminalisation of drugs and 40 years of blatant failure of “war on drugs” has only made the problem worse: increased insecurity in places like Mexico and Ecuador, and the social and financial cost is too high to pay. Policy makers must listen to the people on the front lines of the “war on drugs”. These are the real victims and not criminals and they are better placed to help finding solutions for their problems. There is no point looking the other way pretending everything is fine when there is clear evidence from left, right and centre that the policies have failed.